This paper targets the intersection of two generally distinct literatures: political control of administrative agencies and distributive politics. Based on a comprehensive database of federal spending that tracks allocations from each agency to each congressional district for every year from 1984 through 2007, we analyze the responsiveness of agency spending decisions to presidential and congressional influences. Our research design uses district-by-agency fixed effects to identify the effects of a district's political characteristics on agency spending allocations. Because most agencies distribute federal funds, we are able to provide empirical evidence about the relationship between structural features of administrative agencies and the degree of political responsiveness of their spending decisions. Because allocation of funds constitutes a readily comparable metric over time and across agencies, we are able to evaluate a host of competing hypotheses about the political control of the bureaucracy by both Congress and the President.
INTRODUCTION
This paper offers one of the first large-N empirical studies of the impact of bureaucratic design on decisionmaking by administrative agencies. Early work on the bureaucracy tended to emphasize the bureaucracy's technocratic expertise and celebrated agency insulation from politics. A second generation took the lack of agency accountability to be a problem for governance rather than a solution, culminating in the 1970s with a boon of scholarship emphasizing the pathologies of unaccountable bureaucratic entities. What followed was several decades of scholarship emphasizing the various ways in which Congress and more recently the President can exercise ex ante or ex post control over agency behavior. Today, both the agency problem and the potential mechanisms for managing it are largely taken as given.
The political control of the bureaucracy literature is large and heterogeneous, but there are two main lines of scholarship. A first set of quantitative studies posits an agency problem between the legislature and the bureaucracy, takes agency design as the dependent variable, and then models or estimates design choices made by Congress and the president (e.g. Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Lewis 2008; . For example, both Epstein and O'Halloran (1999) and Lewis (2003) show that the amount of discretion (equivalently, constraint) granted to the bureaucracy depends on political conditions at the time an agency or a program is created. Although it is (sensibly) assumed that structural features of the bureaucracy do constrain policy discretion, the dependent variable actually estimated in these models is agency design. These studies show that the legislature attempts to constrain the bureaucracy more when, for example, the preferences of the agent are further from the enacting legislative coalition. To say that Congress attempts to constrain the bureaucracy using structural agency design mechanisms is not to say that such mechanisms actually do control the bureaucracy. To answer this latter question, one needs to take agency design as an exogenous variable and evaluate agency policy decisions or outputs vary as a function of it.
Thus, a second important line of literature focuses on the degree of political control exerted by congress or the president on a specific agency or policy domain, for example showing that congressional views affect a specific agency's regulations or adjudication decisions.
1 In essence, this literature takes agency design as an explanatory variable and seeks to estimate its impact on agency decisions or outputs. This scholarship is obviously quite important, as it shows the apparent influence of congress or the president on a class of an agency's policy decisions. However, it is quite difficult to make general causal claims about the relationship between political control and structural features of agency design based on case studies of individual agency decisions. Moreover, policy domains are often distinct to across agencies, say the FTC or the EEOC, so comparing policy outcomes across agencies whose design features vary is difficult.
As a consequence, there has been very little quantitative scholarship that establishes a link between a similar agency output across agencies and/or over time and explains variation as a function of agency design.
2 Because the bureaucracy literature tends to focus on agency outputs like regulations or enforcement decisions, there is no obvious metric for comparing or evaluating behavior across agencies. Ideally, we need to know not just whether administrative agencies are ever responsive to politics, but precisely which agencies are how responsive to which sort of political control by which institutional actors. By focusing on an activity common to and comparable across many agencies, we are able to estimate systematically the impact of agency design-long hypothesized to facilitate political control-on actual agency outcomes.
A vast sum of federal money is distributed by administrative agencies each year to different congressional districts. This stream of funds provides a straightforward way to observe changes in agency practice as a function of shifting political conditions and agency design (e.g. structure and process). Because a distribution of federal funds is straightforward to compare across agencies and over time, we are able to estimate whether structural features of agency design long hypothesized to facilitate control by political principals actually affect political influence on agency decisions. Although agency spending is only one of many important agency activities, it is also one that has been largely neglected in empirical studies of agency design and bureaucratic behavior.
Unlike the bureaucracy and administrative law literatures that have under-emphasized spending decisions, allocative spending decisions are the core concern of the well-developed distributive politics literature. That literature has become almost exclusively focused on the legislature. 3 Whether one applauds or bemoans pork barrel politics, bringing money from Washington to one's home district has long been a core problem for both politicians and scholars (Ferejohn 1974) . The latest incarnation of this political debate has focused on earmarks-the practice of designating specific recipients for appropriated funds (Crespin, Finocchario, and Wanless 2009; Frisch 1998; . In fact, in the last presidential election, the only meaningful debate about earmarks was which candidate opposed them with greater ferocity.
In political science and economics, the theoretical and empirical pork-barrel politics literatures have long focused on the bargaining dynamics that produce a distribution of funds from the legislature to local districts (e.g. Knight 2008; Leavitt & Snyder 1997 . Strangely, however, the role of administrative agencies in this process has been largely ignored as of late.
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When Congress authorizes and appropriates funds for a general class of policy or project, ultimate spending allocation decisions are often, indeed usually, made by the bureaucracy. Importantly, this is true not only for general programmatic appropriations-those lacking earmarks designating recipients-but also the vast bulk of earmarked appropriations (Porter and Walsh 2008) . Most earmarks are contained in committee reports or other aspects of the legislative history of a bill not enacted as part of the formal statute. Most earmarks are therefore not legally binding on agencies that ultimately dispense the funds, as the Office of Management and Budget has itself stated in a directive to agencies.
The actual distribution of most federal funds depends on an administrative agency to implement the legislative bargain. With respect to spending, as most other policy decisions, agency discretion remains the norm on the ground notwithstanding the near exclusive focus on the legislature in the literature on distributive politics. 5 Agencies, of course, might well exercise their discretion so as to implement whatever legislative deal was struck; but, they might not. Given the standard principal-agent formulation that characterizes the interaction between the legislature and the bureaucracy (Huber and Shipan 2006; , there is no shortage of reasons that an administrative agency may not perfectly implement the legislature's preferences. Indeed, earmarks would be almost unnecessary if the bureaucracy were a perfect agent of the legislature.
Bureaucratic discretion about spending or policy choice is a matter of degree, but the notion that bureaucrats lack discretion about spending decisions is categorically false. So long as agencies act as intermediaries in the process of allocating federal moneys to local districts, and so long as agencies exercise significant discretion, then the failure to account for the role of agencies in work on distributive politics generates conclusions that are at best incomplete and at worst incorrect. In this paper, we put agencies front and center and analyze the role that agencies play in the distribution of federal and focus the mechanisms by which the legislative and the executive can and do influence what districts get what funds.
If the congressional spending literature displays a historical blind spot for agencies, scholarship on the bureaucracy has under-emphasized agency spending as an important class of agency behavior to explain or even studied. We seek to bridge these two literatures in order to offer systematic evidence about whether agency design matters for the extent of political control of agency decisions, both across agencies and over time.
Our analysis proceeds roughly as follows. After discussing some relevant literature, we begin be presenting some novel descriptive statistics on agency spending behavior. A known finding in the literature is that Democrat-represented districts receive more federal funds than Republican-represented districts (e.g., Levitt and Snyder 1995) . We present a new measure that summarizes how left-leaning or right-leaning the distribution of federal funds is for a given agency. This provides a straightforward to discus inter-agency and intra-agency differences with respect to an agency's distribution of money.
With this descriptive work in the background, we estimate a series of models of the distribution of federal funds by agencies to congressional districts. We first ask whether agency allocation decisions are affected by standard political factors in the pork barrel politics literature. For example, does a congressional district receive more funds from the Department of Agriculture when the district's representative is from the majority party in congress or is chairperson of a powerful committee or is from the same party as the President? Using a novel fixed effects estimation strategy, we are able to ask whether a given district receives more funds from, for example, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, when the district is represented by Republican than when it is represented by a Democrat. Some agencies are responsive to certain political factors like these, but others are not.
The core of our analysis estimates the interaction between agency design features thought to reduce insulation from political principals (equivalently, enhance politicization) and political factors previously shown to affect how much money districts receive. We show that such political factors have less impact on spending decisions by insulated agencies than they do on more politicized agencies. Design characteristics that enhance politicization and decrease insulation seem to facilitate actual control by Congress and the President. Others agency characteristics, however, enhance Presidential control at the cost of Congressional control or vice versa. We conclude by discussing the implications for several ongoing debates.
I. BACKGROUND AND RELATED LITERATURE
Our work relates to two longstanding literatures, one on the nature of political control of the bureaucracy by Congress and the President, and a second on distributive politics. We discuss each literature briefly and then discuss how insights from each field can help shed light on residual puzzles in the other.
A. Political Control of the Bureaucracy
Historical studies of the bureaucracy in economics, political science, and law have long emphasized agency problems of one sort or another. Picking the right type of agent and ensuring the agent exerts effort, utilizes expertise, and implements policy in keeping with political preferences articulated via statute are some of the dominant challenges in agency design and administrative law. Because agencies generally have better information or expertise than legislators, but may also have different preferences, some mechanism is necessary to ensure desirable agency behavior. There are different ways to carve up this literature, but, as Huber and Shipan (2006) argue, there are two main premises of the modern literature: preference divergence and information asymmetry. That is, agencies (often) have different goals than politicians or different judgments about how best to achieve these goals. Although legislators presumably delegate authority to sympathetic agencies, both career civil servants and political appointees may have views that differ somewhat from the enacting legislative coalition (Nixon 2004) . Agencies also have systematically better information than legislators and this informational advantage might refer to better knowledge about the underlying state of the world (regulation needed or not needed), to the technology for implementing policy (price controls versus cap and trade), or to the level of effort required to implement policy (see generally Aghion and Tirole 1997) . Agency failure might be the result of good-intentioned mistakes (which Congress would prefer not to punish), or shirking (punish) or the intentional implementation of policy different than the enacting legislative coalition desired (which Congress would prefer to punish so long as the enacting coalition continues to exist). Ex post monitoring is important, but it is also costly and can only accomplish so much (Aberbach 1990; Dodd and Schott 1979; Ogul 1976) . A particularly strong form of these claims arose in the late 1970s under the 'delegation as abdication' thesis, which dominated academic debates about the bureaucracy. Critics of the administrative state argued that a headless fourth branch of government had come to run American politics (Lowi 1979) . The unelected and uncontrollable bureaucracy-not the President, Congress, or the courts-was said to drive important public policy.
The next generation of scholars, however, was reared on the structure and process thesis articulated by Weingast (1987, 1989) and refined by others (e.g., Macey 1992; Bawn 1995; Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Balla 1998; Ferejohn 1987) . Although the structure and process thesis now has many variants, its simplest form asserts that legislatures can, in fact, control the bureaucracy. More precisely, legislators can control the exercise of delegated authority, in part, by carefully delineating agency structure and the process by which agency policy is formulated.
Given the challenges of ex post monitoring (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984) , the structure and process literature tends to emphasize ex ante restrictions that mitigate the informational advantage enjoyed by agencies and stack the deck in favor of certain interests to ensure the durability of the original bargain. Much of this literature is focused on the legislature, but such structure and process controls can be utilized by the President as well (see, e.g., Moe 1987) . Restrictions on the appointment and removal of personnel (O'Connell 2008; Eisner and Meier 1990) ; ex ante review of proposed decisions by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) (Bagley and Revesz 2006; Kagan 2001) ; legislative vetoes, and alterations in funding (Wood 1988 (Wood , 1990 ; and jurisdiction (Gersen 2007; Macey 1992 ) are all potential mechanisms for controlling agency behavior.
The structure and process tradition has always been accompanied by evidence about structural features of agency decision-making facilitated political influence on this agency or that regulatory program. But in the past several years there has been more of a sustained effort to test the structure and process theories systematically (Balla 1998; Eisner and Meier 1990; Waterman 1993, 1991) . Agencies appear to shift decisions in response to personnel changes (Wood 1990; Wood and Waterman 1991) and organizational culture (Brehm and Gates 1996) .
The President of course, no less than Congress, has every reason to control the bureaucracy (Moe 1985 ). Yet, the President faces a range of similar problems resulting from the possibility of preference divergence and information asymmetry. Moreover, the President's ability to influence the administration will depend on a range of institutional features, including whether the agency's leadership is insulated from Presidential removal, the organizational location of the agency inside or outside the cabinet hierarchy, and the extent of Presidential appointments in the agency, subject to (or not) Senate approval (Lewis 2003:44-45; Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Khademian 1996; Seidman 1998; Wood and Waterman 1994) . It is generally thought-though rarely shown-that the agencies outside the cabinet level hierarchy and particularly those headed by boards with staggered fixed terms and for cause removal provisions (commissions) are more functionally independent from the President and subject to greater Congressional control (Strauss 1984; Seidman 1998; Lewis 2008:47) . The imposition of qualifications requirements by congress for political appointees that lead agencies may also generate less Presidential control and (perhaps) greater congressional influence (Lewis 2003 : O'Connell 2009 . Similarly, having more politically appointed managers relative to civil service employees should enhance Presidential control over agency behavior (Lewis 2008:98) .
Although the political control of the bureaucracy literature is filled with useful statements of the problem and various mechanisms for political principals to address it, most relevant scholarship is plagued by a recurrent problem. There is no obvious metric for evaluating the degree of control exerted by political principals over bureaucratic agents. This is true not only across agencies, but also even within an agency over time. Although the output we usespending-is an imperfect one, it nevertheless allows us to make some headway estimating the systematic effect of the mechanisms of potential political influence on actual agency outcomes.
B. Distributive Politics
Much of the early distributive politics literature focused expressly on administrative agencies (Arnold 1979) , but this early emphasis was lost for many years until quite recently. 6 In this early distribute politics work, Baron and Ferejohn (1984) develop a model in which a legislator offers proposed legislation that divides a set pot of federal money and show that the distribution of funds depends will either be to a minimum winning coalition if the amendment rule is closed or a broader distribution if the amendment rule is open. Other distributive models that rely on somewhat different theoretical assumptions make more universalist predictions (Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Weingast 1979 Niou and Ordeshook 1991) , meaning that most districts should receive a more equal share of overall spending. In practice, both theoretical and empirical work suggests there is significant variation in the ability of legislators to obtain federal money for home districts (Helpman and Persson 2001; McKelvey and Riezman 1992; McCarty 2000; Knight 2005; Persson 1998; Persson and Tabellini 2002) .
In much of this work the power to propose the initial allocation of funds produces an increase in the proportion the legislator is able to obtain (Yildirium 2007:168) . Both committees and parties are key gatekeepers for authorization and appropriation of federal funds. Members serving on key committees, particularly in leadership positions, are generally thought to be better positioned to ensure their home districts receive funds (Adler and Lapinski 1997; Deering and Smith 1997; Mayhew 1974; Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Weingast and Marshall 1998) . Empirical evidence, however, is mixed. Districts represented on Armed Services or Small Business receive more funds (Alvarez and Saving (1997) , but those on Appropriations and Public works do not. Members on the Agriculture committee seem to receive more agricultural money, but districts represented on the Education and Labor committee do not (Heitshusen 2001) , while membership on the Transportation committee yields systemic benefits (Knight 2005) . On net, committee membership sometimes helps, but it fails to produce the sort of consistent benefits the conventional theoretical literature predicts.
The inherited wisdom about the role of partisan control and congressional spending is similar (see Aldrich 1995; Binder 1997; Rohde 1991) . The majority party controls the legislative agenda McCubbins 2005, 2007) which might mean that majority party membership should be positively correlated with the volume of federal funds brought home. Majority parties are thought to obtain more federal funds for their local districts, which might help them win reelection (Levitt and Snyder 1997) . Empirically, some studies find a positive correlation between spending and the partisan affiliation of a district and the majority coalition in congress or the president's party (Levitt and Snyder 195; Balla et al 2002; Martin 2003) , but some work finds little supporting evidence (Lowry and Potoski 2004; Evans 1994; Bickers and Stein 200_; Lauderdale 2008 ).
In addition to these Congress-centered factors in the distribution of funds, more recent work has emphasized the President's influence over appropriations (Berry, Burden, and Howell 2009) . If proposal power matters in bargaining and politics, the President's power to propose an initial budget could tilt the distribution of federal moneys in his favor. Empirically, being from the same district as the President's party produces a significant increase in received federal funds.
In addition to the ex ante proposal influence of the President, the executive also has ways to influence the distribution of funds ex post. A point often left out of political disputes about legislative earmarks is that the most earmarks still entail bureaucratic discretion because earmarks contained in legislative history are not legally binding on agencies. To the extent that bureaucratic discretion is sometimes influenced by the President, the role of the President in facilitating compliance or noncompliance with earmarks is obviously critical. A modest point, articulated here and elsewhere is that distributive politics models ought to focus more on the executive branch than solely on the internal formal and empirical dynamics of the legislature (Berry, Burden, and Howell 2009; Bertelli and Grose 2009; Ting 2009 ).
However, once the locus of analysis shifts from Congress to the executive branch, both the theoretical models and the empirical analysis need to focus explicitly on the role of agencies in the spending process. If agency problems are even fractionally as severe as the literature suggests, there is no good reason to suspect that bureaucratic organizations will be perfect agents with respect to distributing program funds while notoriously imperfect agents in all other policy domains. Indeed, an unwieldy body of law governs spending of budgeted funds (see generally Fisher 1975) . In some contexts, the President or agencies may decline to spend appropriated funds at all, or to shift funds across programs within a budget account, or transfer funds from one budget account to another entirely. Impoundment, rescission, and transfer of funds across budget accounts are controversial practices, but also fairly common historically.
C. Administrative Agencies and the Distribution of Federal Funds
The modern focus on the legislature in the distributive politics literature is actually a sharp divergence from early scholarship. Arnold's (1979) seminal work explicitly sought to understand the congressional-bureaucratic relationship with regards to geographic allocation of funds. He argued that the rational bureaucrats would form an implicit bargain with the legislature: bureaucrats would distribute funds in a manner desired by legislators in order to maintain budgetary stability (Arnold 1979:22) . On this view, agencies allocate funds to Congressional districts in order to curry favor, and therefore, target districts of representatives who are relatively neutral or mildly opposed to the given program (Arnold 1979:58) .
Our work is very much in the spirit of this scholarship, but diverges in two respects. First, building on Berry, Burden, and Howell (2009), we argue that there are two principals that seek to influence agency spending decisions. It is not only the legislature that cares about bureaucratic spending; the President does as well (Bertelli and Grose 2009) . We therefore attempt to estimate and explain the influence of the President on the spending decisions of different agencies as well. Second, and more important, Arnold advanced a theory in which agency allocation decisions sought to maximize legislative support for programs administered by that agency in an effort to protect and increase agency budgets. Although we are agnostic about the precise form of agency objective functions, we certainly agree that agencies may be responsive to congressional influences. If the agency design literature is correct, however, the degree of responsiveness should itself be a function of institutional features. Rather than assuming that all agencies will be more less equally responsive to the preferences of political preferences, we seek to test whether certain agencies are more responsive because of different agency structures. Stein and Bickers (1995) also emphasize the role of agencies in the distribution of funds. They argue that agencies "have both the opportunity and motivation to be responsive to requests for help from legislators and their constituents (Stein and Bickers 1995:7) . In their model agencies help constituencies become organized by working with interest groups, which will then support the agency's programs in congress (Stein and Bickers 1995:49-50) . Here too, agencies are said to desire stable or increasing budgets and therefore have an incentive to help legislators, constituents, and interests groups. More recently, Bertelli and Grose (2009) argue that agencies distribute funds in accordance with bureaucratic ideological preference and presidential electoral objectives. They show that Department of Defense and Department of Labor grants to states vary as a function of the ideological difference between the relevant cabinet secretaries and senators. Unlike Arnold (1974) who emphasizes agency preference for distributing funds to neutral congressional districts, Bertelli and Grose argue that agencies will distribute greater funds to ideological allies. Agencies are able to do this, in part, because of the various agency problems that characterize the principal-agent relationship: "These [agency] costs attenuate the possibility of political control over the bureau's distributive policy choices increasing de facto the autonomy of the bureau to influence policy outcomes by leveraging the ideological distribution in the Senate to enhance support for its programs" (Bertelli and Grose 2009:931) . While we agree with the claim that bureaucrats will be able to influence the distribution of federal funds, we doubt that political principals like the President and Congress will be unable to exert significant influence on allocative decisions. We build on this work as well, but attempt to estimate whether structural insulation affects how responsive agencies are to political concerns. * * * Notwithstanding the very real agency problems produced by the multiple-principal account of bureaucratic spending, the ability of either the President or members of Congress to influence agency spending decisions is real, if partial. The question is how particular agency characteristics enhance or undermine the ability of the President or Congress to manage the agency problem. As emphasized above, both Congress and the President have a standard laundry list of ex ante and ex post mechanisms that are assumed to influence bureaucratic decisionmaking. Existing literature has shown that these mechanisms are used by the legislature and/or the executive in efforts to constrain administrative agents (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999; Lewis 2003) . Rather than treat agency structure as the dependent variable, we treat it as an independent variable and test whether agency structure systematically affects the degree of agency responsiveness.
II. AGENCIES, MONEY, AND POLITICS A. Background & Data
One of our key contributions is to use the distribution of federal awards as a comparable across-agency metric of political responsiveness. Our federal spending data come from the Federal Assistance Award Data System (FAADS), a government-wide compendium of federal programs. The FAADS archive documents the transfer of almost anything of value from the federal government to a domestic beneficiary, so it includes essentially all federal programs outside of defense. In total, the database tracks approximately $25 trillion (in 2004 dollars) in federal expenditures from 1984 to 2007. Bickers and Stein (1995; assembled and collapsed quarterly FAADS files from fiscal year 1983 to 1997 into annual data files. The data were extended through 2007 by Berry, Burden, and Howell (2009) . The complete database tracks the total dollar amount awarded by each non-defense federal program to recipients in each of the 435 congressional districts during each of the fiscal years. To reflect the fact that money spent this year is based on the budget passed last year, we assign outlays in year t to the legislator who represented the district in year t -1. Going beyond prior studies using FAADS, we further disaggregate the data by federal agency. Our dataset therefore tracks the annual receipts of each congressional district from each originating agency. The total database contains nearly 200,000 agency-by-district-by-year observations. Agency is something of a term of art in the legal literature and a term with many meanings in the political literature. In administrative law, an agency is any entity of the federal government (with certain exceptions) that exercises significant authority. Descriptively, an administrative agency sometimes denotes different organizational units of the executive branch. Sometimes scholars mean large cabinet level bureaucratic entities within the executive branch hierarchy (e.g. Department of Interior), sometimes smaller organizational entities within those units (e.g. Bureau of Land Management within the Department of Interior), sometimes standalone bureaucratic entities (e.g. Environmental Protection Agency), and sometimes so-called independent agencies (e.g. Federal Communications Commission). In the current analysis, we focus on the highest possible of level of aggregation, for example, analyzing spending by the Department of Interior rather than the sub-unit or Bureau of Land Management. In other work, we focus on spending patterns by these smaller units within larger agencies.
At the outset, one of the primary challenges in our analysis is to distinguish politically responsive agency spending from mission driven spending. To illustrate the distinction, observe that the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) tends to distribute most of its outlays to urban areas. Urban areas have more Democratic voters and are more likely to elect Democratic members to represent them in Congress. Therefore, it is the case that most of the grant awards from HUD are received by districts represented by Democrats. It would be unwarranted, however, to conclude based on these facts that HUD's grant allocations are being driven by political favoritism toward Democrats. Rather, the natural mission driven constituency of the agency overlaps the traditional political constituency of one of the two major parties, leading to an observed correlation between agency spending and district partisanship. Figure 1 shows that such partisan correlations in agency outlays are a fairly general phenomenon. The chart shows a variable we call Democratic "tilt," which is defined as the ratio of an agency's annual outlays going to Democratic controlled districts relative to the share of seats in the House controlled by Democrats. Numbers greater than one indicate that Democratic districts receive more money from an agency than would be expected based on their seat share. For instance, if an agency gave 60 percent of its funding to Democratic districts when Democrats controlled only 50 percent of the seats, the observed tilt would be 1.2. Figure 1 demonstrates that all but four agencies in our data demonstrate positive Democratic tilt. FEMA and NASA are among the agencies with the most extreme Democratic tilt, while the Department of the Interior is one of the few agencies that tilts in favor of Republicans. Nevertheless, because agencies have mission-driven objectives, and these objectives may happen to coincide with the presence of partisan voters in a district, it is not possible to conclude based on the sort of evidence shown in Figure 1 that particular agency spending allocations are (or are not) based on political considerations. That is, these summary data cannot establish whether the patterns result from underlying agency preferences, statutory constraints, mission driven priorities, or effective political control. We need a method to disentangle mission-related partisan correlations in the data from agency spending allocations that are causally related to political forces.
Our empirical strategy is as follows. We model the outlays received by each district from each agency in each year as a function of the political attributes of the district's representative and the organizational attributes of the agency, both of which will be explained further below. To partial out spending allocations based on natural mission driven connections between the agency and the district, we include district-by-agency fixed effects. This method accounts for any inherent factors that make a particular district more or less likely to receive funding from a particular agency. Identification in our models comes from changes in spending allocations and political variables, within a district-agency pair, over time.
More formally, consider the following baseline model:
where subscript i denotes (redistricting-specific) congressional districts, j denotes the originating federal agency, and t denotes the year. We account for all observable and unobservable, timeinvariant characteristics of both districts and agencies, as well as the interactions between districts and agencies, by including α ij , which are agency-specific congressional district fixed effects. To control for secular changes in federal domestic spending over time, we include dummies, δ t , for all but one year per redistricting period. The vector X it contains variables measuring the political influence of the districts' congressional representatives, explained below. The vector ψ contains regression coefficients, and ε it is an error term, which we cluster by district.
Within this framework, the coefficients ψ represent our measures of politically responsive spending. For example, when X it contains a dummy variable equal to one for members of the Democratic party, a positive coefficient indicates that a district receives more federal funding during those years in which it sends a Democrat to Washington. The key identifying assumption is that the non-political attributes of a district make it otherwise prone to receive federal funds do not change simultaneously with the change in the political characteristics of its representative. 9 To illustrate, return to the previous HUD example. If HUD gives more money to Democrats, on average, we do not consider this to be politically responsive spending. If, however, HUD gives more money to the same district after it replaces a Republican representative with a Democrat, we consider this to be a politically responsive change in agency spending.
Although there is a novel descriptive contribution from our data, our main interest is not simply identifying politically responsive agency spending. Rather, we want to use the spending outcome to evaluate common claims that structural features of organizational design affect the political responsiveness of agencies. One of the core claims of the structure and process literature is that organizational structure can make agencies accountable to political principals. To take one basic example, Strauss (1984) and others argue that agencies located outside the cabinet level hierarchy on the executive branch organizational chart are subject to much greater legislative influence than agencies within the cabinet level hierarchy. Our data allow us to test this and other similar claims about the relationship between organizational design, political influence, and policy outcome that are comparable across agencies and within an agency over time. That is, we test whether specific organizational features of agencies make them more or less likely to engage in politically responsive grant-making.
Econometrically, we investigate these relationships by extending equation (1) to include interactions between district political characteristics and agency organizational characteristics, as follows:
where Z j is a vector of agency attributes, to be explained below, and the remaining terms are as defined above.
10 Note that the main effects of the agency attributes cannot be identified because they are subsumed in the agency-by-district fixed effects. The variables of primary interest-the interactions between agency and district characteristics-are identified by changes within districts over time in the political attributes of their representative. For example, if X it contains a dummy variable equal to one for members of the majority party, a positive coefficient is indicative of politically responsive spending in favor of the majority, on average across agencies. The variable of interest for the current analysis is the interaction term: a significant positive interaction with an agency attribute in Z j indicates that agencies with that given attribute are more politically responsive to the majority party.
In principle, any agency characteristic that is thought to influence political responsiveness is a candidate for inclusion in Z j . Restrictions on the appointment and removal of personnel, the specification of requisite procedures for agency decision making, presidential prompt letters, ex ante review of proposed decisions by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), committee oversight, legislative vetoes, and alterations in funding and jurisdiction are all potential mechanisms for controlling agency behavior.
For purposes of parsimony, we initially focus on one key organizational design variable: the proportion of political appointees in the upper echelons of the agency. Specifically, we compute the ratio of political appointees to career Senior Executive Service (SES) personnel in the agency. The SES represents the most senior policymaking positions for career civil servants, and the ratio of political appointees to SES personnel is an indicator of the extent to which the key policymakers in an agency are directly chosen by their political principals. This measure of agency politicization features prominently in the work of David Lewis (2008; and is a straightforward initial way to summarize how insulated a given agency is. The basic intuition about appointees, agency design, and political control is that agencies dominated by political appointees are more likely to be responsive to influence by political principals like Congress or the President. To take an extreme example, an agency with no political appointees is presumably more insulated from political influence. Other potential mechanisms of influence exist, of course, including budgets, oversight, restrictions on jurisdiction, and so on. But whether this measure or any other feature of agency design actually affects agency responsiveness is ultimately an empirical question. If none of these structural agency features actually affect agency responsiveness, a generation of work on delegation, oversight, and administrative law would be significantly undermined.
Our data on politicization and other structural features of administrative agencies come from Lewis, who generously makes his data publicly available. 11 We matched the Lewis structural data with the FAADS spending data based on the ID of the originating agency for each federal spending program. Figure 2 shows the distribution of politicization among the agencies in our data, which ranges from roughly zero to 1.6. It appears that science-oriented agencies, such as NASA and NSF, have relatively low levels of politicization, as do agencies that administer major entitlement programs, such as the Social Security Administration and the Department of Veterans Affairs. The most politicized agencies are the Department of Education, the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities, and the Small Business Administration, where political appointees outnumber career SES staff in each case.
Politicization of senior staff is just one of several potentially important aspects of agency design that may influence political responsiveness and we are in the process of exploring others, including whether the agency was created by the President or Congress, whether the agency's leadership is insulated from at-will Presidential removal, whether the agency is located within the cabinet level hierarchy or is a stand-alone agency, and whether qualifications requirements restrict who the President may appoint to the agency.
12 Each of these indicators represents a mechanism by which agencies would be influenced by political principals to a greater or lesser extent.
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C. Agency Design and Mechanisms of Control Table 1 presents the results of our analysis. Because about 15 percent of the observations in our data represent zeroes on the dependent variable-that is, observations in which a given district receives no funding from a given agency-we supplement the OLS results with equivalent Tobit models.
14 Nevertheless, because the conclusions from the Tobit models almost never diverge from those of the basic OLS model, we mainly discuss the OLS estimates for simplicity. Models 1 and 3 of Table 1 estimate a version of equation (1) above and show the impact of political factors on agency spending. For example, a positive coefficient on the variable indicating whether the district's representative is a ranking member of any committee implies that the district receives more funds with a ranking member than without a ranking member. Columns 2 and 4 estimate versions of equation (2) above and contain the main results of the paper. The political factors from the first column are interacted with a measure of agency insulation. To illustrate, a positive coefficient on the interaction of ranking committee member and political insulation indicates that having a ranking committee member affects the funds received from politicized (less insulated) agencies more than it does from insulated agencies. Statistically significant interaction terms show that structural features of the agencies affect the extent to which political influences affect agency spending. Table 1 are worth note. First the results in models 1 and 3 are largely consistent with the existing literature, in particular Berry, Burden, and Howell (2009). 15 12 All these factors are discussed in work by Lewis and others. 13 Future drafts of the paper will present additional results for these and other new agency variables.
Several findings from
14 Because there is no fixed effects counterpart in a Tobit model, we use random effects in those analyses. 15 Note that the inclusion of agency fixed effects actually does produce some differences from the results shown in Berry, Burden, and Howell (2009) . A puzzle in that paper is the null results for committee membership. A fairly common hypothesis in the literature is that districts receive more funds when their representative is a ranking Notably, districts receive more federal funds from agencies when their representative is a member of the president's party. Districts receive more funds when their representative has a committee chair or a ranking committee member. Freshman legislators do worse by their districts than more senior legislators. And, representatives elected by slim majorities receive more funds from agencies, which is consistent with the idea that legislators allocate funds to help electorally vulnerable colleagues. Finally, districts receive less federal money when they are represented by Republicans, consistent with Levitt and Snyder (1995) . Models 2 and 4 contain the main results, replicating the OLS model just discussed, but with interaction terms between the degree of agency politicization and district political conditions. 16 Again, recall that politicization is simply the inverse of insulation in our estimates. And, while insulation can be measured in various ways, the current analysis follows Lewis (2008; and emphasizes the dominance of political appointees in the agency. The basic intuition is that the more political appointees there are that control an agency, the more influence political principals are to have over the agency.
Because we include agency fixed effects in our initial model and because we utilize timeinvariant measures of agency insulation, we do not estimate the direct effect of insulation on spending. Rather, we interact the agency insulation measure with political influences, asking whether political factors (e.g. being in the majority congressional party) matter less for insulated agencies than for politicized agencies. Our main contribution is to explain this differential responsiveness to political factors as a function of institutional design. Agencies with institutional features making them more susceptible to control by congress and the president are more responsive to changes in the political environment.
First consider the interaction between agency politicization a district's membership in the president's party. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant. Districts receive more funds from the average agency when represented by a member of the President's party, and this effect grows as agency insulation decreases. In other words, being represented by a member of the President's party matters more when agencies are politicized than when they are not. Figure 3 contains a graph of the marginal effect of membership in the president's party as a function of agency politicization. As the ratio of political appointees to career SES staff in an agency increases from .5 to 1, for example, the marginal increase (decrease) in funding when a district moves into (out of) the president's party is roughly 8 percentage points. Meanwhile, for highly insulated agencies-those with the lowest level of politicization by our measure-membership in the president's party has no significant effect on district funding.
Aside from the interaction between presidential alignment and agency politicization, note that most of the interaction terms do not yield statistically significant results. Although being represented by a ranking committee member or a committee chair does produce an increase in funds received by the district, that increase does not depend on whether the agency administering those funds is insulated or politicized. We have selected one of the most direct measures of member of a relevant committee. Our results suggest that there are committee effects, but that they are not equal across agencies. agency insulation and yet the only political variable for which it matters is presidential influence. Although these results certainly do not rebut the entire structure and process thesis, they do show that one measure of agency insulation does not appear to condition congressional influence on agency decisions.
Given that politicization does interact with presidential, but not congressional, factors, we next attempt to disentangle these two sorts of political influence on agencies. To do so, we distinguish political appointees that require Senate confirmation and political appointees that do not require Senate confirmation. If the fact of Senate confirmation provides for greater congressional influence-or put differently-less presidential control, then these two sorts of political appointees in an agency should make for two very different kinds of political influence. A large pocket of non-senate-confirmed political appointees should facilitate Presidential influence, but not necessarily congressional influence. A large pocket of appointees on which the Senate must sign off might imply appointees with greater legislative sympathies. The analysis in Table 2 essentially replicates the earlier analysis with these two different types of agency politicization.
The first four rows of Table 2 summarize the main effects of the membership in president's party and the majority congressional party and the interaction of these variables with agency politicization. First consider the effect adding Senate-approved appointees to an agency (models 1 and 3). The interaction term is only significant for the majority party variable. While the interaction term is still positive for the president's party, it falls shy of statistical significance and is notably smaller than the interaction with the majority party. In other words, agencies with more Senate-confirmed appointees are more responsive to members of the majority party, though not to members of the president's party. Precisely the opposite is observed with respect to nonSenate confirmed appointees (models 2 and 4). The interaction between politicization and the majority party in Congress is statistically insignificant. However, the interaction between the presence of non-Senate confirmed appointees and membership in the president's party is positive and highly significant. In summary, the effect of having a representative in the majority party of congress matters more-in terms of the funds a district receives-for agencies densely populated by senate-confirmed appointees, but no more or less for agencies populated with non-senateconfirmed appointees. This makes good sense of course. As political appointees integrate into agencies, those that did not have to go through senate confirmation are likely to be more responsive to the president and less responsive to the legislature. Politicization via appointments requiring legislative involvement seems to facilitate congressional political influences, but not Presidential political influence. Although these results merely constitute a first cut at the issues, the evidence indicates that agency insulation can, but does not always, mediate the nature and extent of political influence on bureaucratic action. * * * To be clear, our results are consistent with two different types of political influence. Because we cannot observe the actual bargain struck in the legislature, it is impossible to distinguish two ways in which an agency might be responsive to political factors. One interpretation is that the agency is proactively seeking to curry favor with legislators by distributing grants to influential members. This theory would be consistent with Arnold (1974) , who argued that agencies distribute funds in order to gain favor and maintain legislative support for agency-administered programs. A second interpretation is that although we cannot observe the actual legislative bargain, we have theoretical reasons to expect certain parties to do better or worse in those negotiations. And, in fact, we observe those players receive more funds from less insulated agencies. Each of these interpretations if consistent with agency responsiveness to political influence, but they are different mechanisms by which that influence occurs.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Our main result is that structural features of agency design affect the degree of political influence exerted by the President and Congress on the distribution of federal funds by administrative agencies. There is a sense in which this finding is banal. Of course, a critic might say, the more insulated an agency is the harder it will be to control the agency. The more levers a principal has to pull or push, the greater control over the agent the principle will be able to exert. Our empirical analysis merely suggests this is true. Yet, even framed in this uncharitable way, the findings have broad implications for the literatures on agency design, distributive politics, and comparative control of agencies by the President and Congress.
Scholarly literature on congressional control of the bureaucracy is generally quite good at formalizing the nature of the agency problem and on providing ex post rational reconstructions of choices about agency design (e.g., Bawn 1993; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Cornell, Noll, and Weingast 1976; Moe 1990) . Similarly, enormous progress has been made to show that Congress utilizes structural features of agency design in an attempt to exert greater control over agencies (Epstein and O'Halloran 1999) . And a long line of scholarship on individual agencies has documented political influence on particular decisions.
Nevertheless, because it is easy to compare changes in the distribution of dollars across agencies, our method provides a simple way of evaluating the more general claim: agency design affects political responsiveness. There is a paucity of large-N empirical analysis on this firstorder question and our early results fill some of this gap. Rather than claiming that some institutional features could plausibly or might theoretically facilitate influence by the president or the legislature, we show that empirically, these features of agency design are actually associated with greater agency responsiveness to legislative or presidential influence. Congressional districts receive more or less federal funds as a function of these institutional features. Rather than estimate the probability that Congress relies on structure and process to try to control agencies, we show that agencies seem in fact to be more controlled by both congress and the president as a function of these structural features.
That said, at least the main indicator of agency insulation we utilize certainly does not always facilitate political control of agencies. Indeed, although we continue to explore the issue in ongoing work, early analysis suggests no empirical effects for other indicators of agency insulation that have long been prominent in the literature. Location inside or outside the cabinet hierarchy does not affect the political responsiveness of agency spending, nor does the fact of executive creation rather than legislative creation. If these basic structure and process characteristics do not empirically affect agency responsiveness, this constitutes a challenge to a generation of research in administrative law and the bureaucracy.
The literature on delegation and oversight has long focused mainly on Congressional control of administrative behavior, but more recently the literature has shifted toward the President and the associated multiple-principal problems. When both the President and the legislature seek to influence agency spending decisions, this produces a distinct problem and opportunity for the agency (Bertelli and Grose 2009) . It might be taken to increase agency slack and reduce agency accountability. Our results, however, show that both legislative and presidential influences affect the distribution of agency funds. At a minimum, our analysis shows systematic influence of congressional and presidential forces on a comparative set of agency outputs, across agencies and over time.
Our work also speaks to the ongoing debate about the degree to which agencies are influenced by Congress versus the President and why. A common critique of the George W. Bush's administration was that it politicized the bureaucracy. In an effort to exert greater control over policymaking by administrative agencies, the administration was said to have inserted more layers of political appointees into the bureaucracy. The main objection to this practice was twofold. First, it injected political or ideological influences into domains that were alleged to be better guided by technocratic expertise and neutrality. That is, the practice seemed to allow crass politics to trump scientific judgment. Second, and more important for current purposes, it was alleged to shift the locus of power from administrators to whom Congress had expressly delegated policymaking authority to the President. Presidential politicization was said to increase executive influence at the cost of congressional influence.
Our analysis shows this concern is both right and wrong. It is right in the sense that adding political appointees to an agency does increase agency responsiveness to the President (or at least, members of the president's party). For a politicized agency, the same congressional district will receive more federal funds when it is represented by a member of the President's party than when it is represented by a non-member.
The concern is wrong-or at least incomplete-in the sense that politicization of this sort can also increase legislative influence. Non-senate confirmed appointees appear to facilitate presidential control, but senate-confirmed appointees appear to facilitate legislative control. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that these appointees are selected by the President, inserting more of them into agencies can increase not only Presidential control, but also legislative control. Thus, although insulation from political influence may be normatively attractive or unattractive in a given setting, the Presidential decision to politicize is actually a double-edged sword. By inserting partisans into the agency, the President can gain some control, but may also simultaneously increase the degree of Congressional control.
Our results, therefore shed some light on the use of czars or high level policy advisers outside the administrative structure as compared with the insertion of layers of political control within the agency. The former advantages the President alone, while the latter advantages both the President and the Congress. Agencies saturated with non-senate-confirmed political appointees are not more responsive to congressional politics with respect to their distribution of federal funds.
We also provide some additional fodder for the broader debate about accountability in the bureaucracy. Contra the delegation as abdication thesis advanced by Lowi and others in the 1970s, we find that agency decisions about funding are responsive-sometimes and to differing degrees-to legislative and presidential influences. Such responsiveness depends on choices about how bureaucratic institutions are structured. Agencies can be insulated, in which case, influence of political principals is less-as the analysis shows. Yet, agencies can also be made responsive and those agencies that are made more responsive can be controlled to a significant extent by Congress and the President. Put more precisely, the extent of agency accountability to both the President and the Congress is a partial function of how a given agency is structured and designed.
Nevertheless, such control is imperfect and as such, our work is directly relevant to the distributive politics literature as well. Crafting a legislative coalition and reaching internal agreement on which district should get which funds is only the starting point for the distribution of federal funds. Ensuring that the legislative bargain is implemented remains. As is the case for other bureaucratically administered federal policies, agencies are not costless pass-throughs for legislative judgments. As such, both the legislature and the executive will seek mechanisms through which agency discretion can be controlled. A deal that is formed without explicit consideration of these agency costs may well go significantly awry. Although we are not asserting that standard models of legislative bargaining and coalition formation in the pork barrel politics literature are incorrect, we propose that more serious attention should be given to the agency implementation problem in this domain, extending some of the themes from Arnold (1974) and Bickers and Stein (1995) .
Related, our work sheds light on the ongoing debate about earmarks in the budget process. Most earmarks constitute not legal obligations but instead statements about legislative views regarding the allocation of federal funds. Given this fact, debates about earmarks that ignore the role of agencies are starkly incomplete. Although most accounts of agencies in the federal budgetary process theorize why agencies have an incentive to implement legislative bargains (Bickers and Stein 1995; Arnold 1974) , like Bertelli and Grose (2009) , we emphasize that the agency has many reasons not to. The entire field of administrative law is built on an assumption that administrative agencies may not always act as faithful agents. There is virtually no domain in which scholarly consensus suggests agencies simply implement congressional views and it would be surprising if this were the case for earmarks and administrative spending.
Finally, normative evaluations of earmarks are likely to depend on how often those earmarks are implemented by the bureaucracy. To take an extreme example, if most earmarks are the equivalent of legislator speeches on the floor and virtually ignored by bureaucrats allocating funds, the earmarks debate is much ado about nothing. Our point is not that earmarks do not influence bureaucratic spending decisions, but rather that the degree of influence will vary depending on how agencies are designed. Like all agency outputs, the ability of political principals to affect agency decisions depends on extent of the agency problem and the available mechanisms to help solve it. We have focused on only one of several potential measures of bureaucratic insulation and politicization. Nevertheless, the analysis suggests that agency design significantly affects the magnitude of congressional and presidential influence on agency spending decisions.
CONCLUSION
This paper unites two largely disparate literatures in an attempt to make headway on core problems in administrative law and distributive politics. By focusing on the distribution of federal funds by administrative agencies, we sought to test the proposition that agency design facilitates the control of agencies by congress and the president. We showed that more insulated and less politicized agencies are less responsive to political factors when making spending allocations. As such, our analysis provides fodder for several ongoing debates about the relationship between the legislature, the president, and the bureaucracy. Political influence is not uniform across agencies, but varies in predictable ways as a function of agency design. 
